This book will be of use to political science students at both the undergraduate and graduate level, particularly those interested in electoral studies, political institutions, politics and gender, and minority representation.
Mixed-member electoral systems may well be the electoral reform of the 21st century, much as proportional representation PR was in the 20th century. In the view of many electoral reformers, mixed-member systems offer the best of both the traditional British single-seat district system and PR systems. This book seeks to evaluate: why mixed-member systems have recently appealed to many countries with diverse electoral histories; and how well expectations for these systems have been met.
Each major country, which has adopted a mixed system thus, has two chapters in this book, one on origins and one on consequences. In addition, there are also chapters on the prospects for a mixed-member system being adopted in Britain and Canada, respectively. The material presented suggests that mixed-member systems have been largely successful thus far. They appear to be more likely than most other electoral systems to generate two-bloc party systems, without in the process reducing minor parties to insignificance.
In addition, they are more likely than any other class of electoral system to simultaneously generate local accountability as well as a nationally-oriented party system.
Mixed-member electoral systems have now joined majoritarian and proportional systems as basic options which must be considered whenever electoral systems are designed or redesigned. Such a development represents a fundamental change in thinking about electoral systems around the world. In a controversial move recently, New Zealanders voted to introduce a new electoral system known as mixed member proportional MMP.
In the first election will be held under this system. Supporters of MMP claim that it will reduce the power of the cabinet, enhance the role and influence of Parliament, increase public consultation, more accurately represent the people's political preferences, and end the old adversarial style of politics. Get The electoral law of New Zealand Books now!
Department of Justice. Planning and Development Division, published by Unknown which was released on The year is the th anniversary of Parliamentary elections in New Zealand and this book was commissioned by the Electoral Commission to celebrate. In a well-illustrated and readable text, the book takes the reader through the evolution of modern voting. In a series of backroom negotiations in , the National Government and Labour Opposition agreed to put aside adversarial politics temporarily and entrench certain significant electoral rules.
For any of these rules to be amended or repealed, Section of the Electoral Act now Section of the Act requires the approval of. First published in , this volume is based upon the files of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System plus extensive interviews with the Commissioners, cabinet ministers, MPs and officials, as well as leaders of the principal pressure groups. It seeks to place this highly important change in context, reviewing both.
Mixed-member electoral systems may well be the electoral reform of the 21st century, much as proportional representation PR was in the 20th century. The more positive coalition experience after the election appears to have restored some confidence in coalition governments, particularly in their ability to deliver democratic accountability Vowles Support for Proportionality As with support for coalition governments, we use several questions to measure support for proportionality.
The questions were designed to measure abstract principles and their various implications. Table 5 reports the distribution by party for candidates and electors. As the data in the table show, substantial majorities agree with the principle of proportionality and with the ideal that governments should have a majority not just a plurality of voting support.
While just over a third support the principle of a manufactured majority, slightly more oppose it. While more agree that MMP gives too much power to small parties than disagree, there is a much bigger margin of support behind the claim that first past the post gives too much power to large parties. Tables 5 and 6 about here Table 6 displays the results of a question designed to force respondents to trade off their preferences for proportionality, if they have them, against those they might have for single-party government.
It is significant that post trade-off support for proportionality remains quite consistently around the 50 per cent mark, even in July when MMP was most unpopular Vowles As can be seen in Table 6, residual support for the principle and practice of proportional representation remains relatively strong in New Zealand even when controlling for partisan support.
Overall, support is highest among those who voted for smaller parties and among all candidates except those from National. When compared to support for retaining MMP see Table 1 , support for proportionality is higher. Support for MMP is more problematic, as that label may be associated with lengthy coalition talks, failed coalitions, political scandal and party hopping MPs.
Because we hypothesise that the effect of these abstract principles and self-interest on support for a specific electoral system will be conditioned by understanding of that electoral system, we next examine understanding of MMP in the context of learning about a new electoral system. Understanding MMP Those who claim that MMP is a complex system and too difficult for the average voter to understand find support in research into the German electoral system which indicates that significant numbers of German voters do not understand the purposes of their two votes Jesse , Roberts , Schoen ; for an opposing view see Bawn Table 7 shows changes over time in understanding using a question asking respondents to identify which vote is most important in determining which party gets the largest share of seats.
Understanding of the primacy of the party vote in was almost exactly the same as in , despite a much lower budget allocated by the government for electoral education. This level of understanding is at least comparable to that in Germany, and may be slightly better Banducci, Karp and Vowles , The pre-election question varies significantly from the other questions measuring the importance of the party vote in that the categories were not presented to survey respondents.
When not offered this alternative, more respondents were likely to correctly identify the party vote as the most important. However, if one just compares the proportion giving the most incorrect answer, the electorate vote, the percentage of misunderstanding has declined slightly from 13 to 10 percent. Respondents to the pre-election survey were asked whether it was true or false that the party vote usually determines the number of seats that a party wins.
Taking both questions together, we can be confident in concluding that well over the half of the electorate understands the meaning of the two votes. Of Scottish respondents to an election survey 30 percent gave the correct answer while 21 percent gave the correct answer in Wales Curtice, et al. While the questions we use do not directly measure whether citizens know that the system is proportional, we can assume that voters who know that the party vote is most important in determining the allocation of seats are more likely to know that the system is proportional.
Table 7 about here Explaining Support for MMP: Multivariate Models We next turn to a multivariate model to examine the relationship between support for a specific electoral system and support for abstract concepts associated with electoral systems and how knowledge conditions this relationship. We hypothesise that support for MMP is related to support for proportionality and coalition government. We also hypothesise that knowledge about MMP may condition the relationship between these abstract concepts and support for a specific electoral system.
Those who know more about the electoral system are also more likely to know that the particular system they are being asked to evaluate either promotes or does not promote proportionality or coalition governments.
We construct three scales that measure support for proportionality, coalition government and strategic voting see appendix. We also include a scale measuring specific knowledge of MMP and general knowledge of New Zealand politics. Because partisan self- interest is a strong influence on support for MMP, we also control for party support.
To examine whether issues of accountability influence support for MMP, we include a variable indicating whether a respondent believes that voters should decide the order of election of candidates who appear on the party list.
Overall, 57 percent favour open lists, indicating a substantial amount of support for reforming the system. If accountability is a concern, those who believe that voters should decide the order of those who appear on the list should be less supportive of MMP. A series of social and demographic measures have also been included as controls. We use three different dependent variables to measure support for MMP. In turn, these evaluations of fairness are expected to influence whether a respondent thinks MMP has been a disaster or a success.
Finally, to examine the indirect and direct effects of support for proportionality and our other scales, we estimate a model predicting whether respondents would vote to retain MMP. Attitudes toward a particular electoral system should be antecedent to whether or not an individual would behave in a way that reflects these attitudes. The results in Table 8 show that support for the concept of proportionality and coalition governments do influence support for MMP.
However, support for coalition governments has a stronger effect on support for MMP. In the second model, even after controlling for evaluations of the fairness of MMP, support for proportionality and coalitions still affect whether or not a respondent believes MMP has been a success, although the effects are almost half when controlling for fairness.
However, the direct effects of proportionality on retaining MMP the third model disappear when controlling for both fairness and whether a respondent thinks MMP has been a disaster or success. As expected, the effect of support for proportionality, coalition governments and strategic voting are conditioned by knowledge. However, they show that the effect of preferring proportional outcomes on thinking MMP is fairer is greatest for the most knowledgeable.
One might conclude then that if more citizens knew that MMP fostered proportionality support would be greater. The same conditioned relationship exists for coalition support and preference for strategic voting.
Partisan effects are still evident when controlling for proportionality and coalition governments. National is the reference category. Therefore, those voting for any party other than National is more likely to think that MMP is fairer than someone voting for National. The largest partisan effect is for Green voters. Even Act voters are significantly more likely to think MMP is fairer. We cannot dismiss partisan effects entirely as some are conditioned by MMP knowledge.
Knowledgeable supporters of smaller parties on the left, the Alliance and the Green Party are more likely to say that MMP has been a success. Finally we see that those who would prefer that voters have a direct influence on the ordering of the party list have a lower probability of supporting MMP.
This would suggest that voter assessments of the system are based not just on partisan advantage and electoral outcomes but also on process. Dissatisfaction with the selection and performance of list MPs is likely to have had some influence on shaping attitudes toward the new system. Given that a sizeable majority favours open lists, this finding might suggest one way of reforming the electoral system to achieve greater support. Table 8 here We have run similar models using the candidate survey.
The knowledge scales could not be replicated as the questions were not included in the candidate survey. The strategic voting scale was not replicated either. However, we might assume that candidates are as knowledgeable about MMP and New Zealand politics as the most knowledgeable electors. In addition to the variables hypothesised to influence support for MMP, we include other measures specific to candidates.
We might expect those candidates standing as list MPs to be more likely than those standing in electorates to support MMP. Similarly we might expect those standing as both electorate and list MPs to be more favourable. Given that MMP offers candidates two chances of winning a seat in parliament, we might also expect candidates to be more supportive than incumbents. We also include a measure similar to that used in the previous model to measure support for open lists.
Unlike the results for the voter survey, this measure is highly skewed; just nine candidates support the idea of having voters choose who appears on the list. Evaluations of fairness are largely based largely on support for proportionality and coalition government.
Compared to National candidates, all other party candidates are more likely to believe MMP is a success. Unlike fairness, support for proportionality has no significant influence on success though preference for coalition government is still significant.
When it comes to whether a candidate would vote to retain MMP, evaluations of fairness and assessment of MMP are the strongest predictors. Indeed, none of the other variables are significant, indicating that the effects of partisanship and proportionality are mediated by these other two variables.
In addition, incumbents are no less likely to favour MMP than candidates. Unlike the mass opinion data, Maori candidates are no more likely to see MMP as more fair than non-Maori candidates. These findings suggest that group based representation is not a factor influencing support for MMP. Finally, we see that those who would prefer that voters choose who appears on the party list are no less supportive.
Table 9 here Conclusion Our results indicate that elites express much stronger support for MMP than voters. ACT voters are an exception. They exhibit lower levels of support for MMP than ACT candidates and have a stronger preference for single party government.
As a result, their attitudes more closely resemble those held by National voters and candidates. There is some evidence that a large number of ACT voters are strategic rather than sincere voters Johnston and Vowles This might help to explain the discrepancy. In addition, the multivariate models show that preference for coalition governments and proportionality strongly condition responses to MMP.
For voters, these effects are stronger for those more knowledgeable about MMP. Knowledge also works to enhance the effects of partisan interests on support for MMP. For elites, preference for coalition government and proportional outcomes indirectly influences support for retaining MMP. Public opinion remains divided, and further change in the system remains an option.
An active lobby is likely to continue to promote a return to FPP or similar system, but the most part of submissions favour retaining MMP. To the extent that most parties feel that MMP serves their interest, any change in the system is likely to be minor. MMP Fairer: Do you agree or disagree with these statements. Proportionality scale: 3 items 1 Imagine that a party wins the most votes in an election with about 40 per cent of the vote.
An election should give each party a percentage of the seats in parliament equal to its per cent of the party vote. An election should ensure tha only one party is needed to form a government. Strategic voting scale: 2 items Do you agree or disagree with these statements? MMP knowledge scale: 3 items 1 The party votes usually decide the total number of seats each party gets in Parliament.
Which do you think is the most important in deiciding which party will get the largest number of seats in Parliament? Open lists Voters, not parties, should decide which of the candidates on the party list get the seats the party has won. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
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